Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel - Kurdish Globe
Authorization of military action
On October 17, the Turkish Parliament passed a controversial motion that effectively allowed the Turkish military a year's pass to launch incursions into northern Iraq as it sees fit, under the pretext of preserving national security and eradicating the long-standing PKK threat emanating from the Qandil Mountains of the Kurdistan region.
Despite strong objections from Iraq, the U.S. administration, NATO, the EU, and a plethora of major States, Turkey approved the bill in defiance. With a huge occupation force in the shape of the U.S. Army still on the ground, this hardly gives a positive image of Iraqi sovereignty and may well set a benchmark for future invasions by neighbors.
Turkey's battle with the PKK is not new. In fact, Turkey has been waging war on the PKK for 28 years in the impoverished and largely neglected lands of southeastern Turkey. This war reached a peak in the mid-1990s, culminating in a series of large cross-border campaigns by the Turkish military to oust rebel bases across the porous borders.
Clearly, these campaigns did no significant damage to the PKK nor did they eradicate the threat, even as those campaigns were supported by some Iraqi Kurdish parties at the time. However, although five years of unilateral truce by the PKK on the back of the arrest of their leader, Abdullah Ocalan, resulted in some peace and a motion to readdress its adverse international image, the PKK made very little political gains with the Turkish government persistent in its refusal to negotiate with their 'terrorist' arch-nemesis or issue amnesty.
Feeling lost and weary on the back of the dramatic arrest and trial of their revered leader, the influence and power of the PKK steadily dropped. However, clearly the onset of the Iraqi liberation in 2003 and the newfound prominence and political stature of the Iraqi Kurds served to embolden PKK desire and reignited their passion for making another stand against the Turkish regime.
Clearly, this time the PKK has more political coverage than ever before along with broader media attention. The status of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is now enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution and widely recognized by major global powers. Arguably, the long-standing rivalry with the PKK became second nature to a Turkish state that long-denied its substantial Kurdish population cultural and linguistic rights and before that systematic denial altogether, but now to its horror was witnessing a strong Kurdish national renaissance a stone's throw across the border.
Iraqi Kurds-the real Turkish danger
It is likely that with parliamentary approval of military incursions valid for one year, this will give the Turkish state time to maneuver and watch the KRG closely with an upcoming decisive year that will determine the future of Iraq. The ideal scenario for Turkey would be to maintain a long-term foothold and influence over northern Iraq, rather than attack at will.
Under a period of self-rule, the Iraqi Kurds have grown from strength to strength, witnessing an economic boom, status as key strategic allies to the U.S. administration and widely acknowledged as the only island of peace and prosperity in the mess that is Iraq. Whilst Kurdish confidence has reached alarming new heights for the Turkish state, which as of today still refuses to recognize the Kurdish administration or negotiate with them on an official level, many of the red lines set by the Turkish government have long passed with the Iraqi Kurds hungry and determined to bolster their status and political gains further.
In the year officially set for a referendum on the status of oil-rich Kirkuk, frequent Turkish calls for the abandonment of such a momentous milestone have gone unheard. Turkey has lobbied with the Iraqi government extensively to dismiss the referendum out-of-hand or at least delay it indefinitely citing various concerns. In contrast this has only increased Kurdish determination and desire and with the knowledge that they are almost certain victors in any vote they have pressed on without fear.
Undoubtedly, Turkey and the surrounding neighbors fear that if Kurdish aspirations are unchecked, this may well create an unstoppable ripple affect for the millions of Kurds inhabiting those countries.
Although, the PKK issue has acted as the focal point in channeling Turkish fears, the presence of an estimated 3,000 rebels in the rugged mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan is clearly a side issue to the greater concerns of the ramifications of the potential destabilization affect of 15 million Turkish Kurds.
Prospects of a full-scale invasion
Clearly, launching any military incursion into Iraq may well backfire. The PKK rebels will disperse into Kurdish towns and villages and even major air raids may lack the effectiveness of getting the job done. A highly unpopular Turkish invasion will only encourage support and sympathy for the PKK amongst Iraqi Kurds.
Any major incursion deep into KRG territory may well induce direct confrontation with the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, which is likely to only deepen the issue and increase the risk of an all-out Turkish-Kurdish war.
As a result of these factors, a full-scale invasion in reality is unlikely and much more costly than the limited gains it may provide. Alienating Kurdish populations on either side of the border who heavily rely on one another for billion of dollars in trade is political and economical suicide. This motion, for the time being, at least, is more sabre-rattling and show of power and intent. It is designed to further pressurize the U.S. and Iraqi governments into action and warn the Iraqi Kurds of the dangers of defiance, harboring the PKK, or continuing separatist ambitions.
Changing political climate
Turkey has long accused the U.S. administration of not doing enough to tackle the PKK issue and has called on the Iraqi government to take action.
However, the key problem with any U.S. action to deal with the PKK is the potential to undermine their strong relationship with the Iraqi Kurds and destabilize the only stable part of Iraq. Noticeably, for a Turkey suffering from a dramatic decline of their traditional closeness with the U.S., this is seen as preferential treatment of the Kurds and double standards in the fight against terrorism.
The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan by U.S. forces and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon last year set a dangerous precedent for superpowers combating terrorism and threats against national security. Turkey feels it is no exception to the rule and only wider strategic and political implications stopped it from invading in 2003 to dispel Kurdish drive toward power and the expansion of their region.
However, events in the last year and more recently have irked Turkey beyond care of the repercussions of their actions. First, Turkey introduced mild reforms and introduced more cultural tolerance of their Kurdish minority under EU accession talks. However, despite what it perceived as more than a gesture of goodwill, the reforms on the back of EU pressure did not continue apace. Talks have all but stalled and the divide has only deepened with major reservations from key European nations over the potential influx of millions of largely impoverished Muslims into their Christian super club.
Turkey, in its gradual changing political stance and its fast emerging ties with the controversial governments in Syria and Iran, has seemingly all but given up on the idea of an imminent entry into the European Union and turned its attention to its more immediate concerns. Turkish public opinion has hardly helped, as a strong sense of nationalism has kicked in over the Iraqi Kurdish calls of defiance, frequent PKK attacks, and the fast-declining popularity of the U.S. in the country.
Turkish-U.S. ties under strain
Whilst the frequently failed promises by the U.S. administration to deal with the PKK hardly helped, two events that arguably swayed Turkish political opinion and deep-rooted anxiety into overdrive was their disappointment over a U.S. Senate motion, referred to as the Biden-Brownback amendment, to push through the break-up of Iraq into three federal entities; then, there was their downright anger over the passing of a non-binding resolution by the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee to officially recognize the Armenian massacre between 1915-1923 under Ottoman rule as genocide.
This created uproar in public, political, and military circles alike, with Turkey swiftly condemning the resolution and warning President Bush of the massive ramifications that this would have in their relationship and their logistical support of U.S. troops in Iraq, if the resolution was formally passed.
Similar moves by France caused similar rage and ended military ties between both nations.
Turkey is moving through a time of great sensitivity and fears that perhaps they can only rely on themselves in the present era. The changing face of the political and strategic makeup of the Middle East and international focus has rocked Turkey's once unbreakable alliance with the U.S., reaching a peak at the time of the Cold War. However, the U.S. has greater priorities than ever before and faces its gravest danger in the form of terrorism.
The global aspects and wider implications of their foreign policies are more important than any relationship with a single country.
Iraqi Kurds bypassed
The region and the international community are now watching closely at Turkey's next steps. What is clear, however, is that Turkey's next steps must be taken cautiously and wisely. Any hasty or controversial adventure that goes beyond the remit of a limited incursion may well result in a major backlash.
The Iraqi Kurds, keen as ever to strike friendly and productive terms, fully appreciate that for their long-term prosperity and survival they must cooperate very closely with Turkey. However, even they are feeling increasingly undermined by the actions of regional powers and the insistence of Turkey in bypassing them in negotiations with the Iraqi government.
A recently signed security deal between Iraq and Turkey bypassed the Iraqi Kurds directly with the Baghdad government insistent that all elements of national foreign policy must be channeled through them.
However, evidently the region at the focus of the debate is the Kurdish administration. Turkey will be effectively invading the autonomous KRG region and as such violating their rights and sovereignty directly.
It is ironic that a nation that refuses to recognize a political entity would directly invade their area of jurisdiction and expect to bypass them as any matter of importance.
Despite the rhetoric of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Turkey's ignorance, there is nothing that Baghdad can do in the Kurdish region. There is no Iraqi Army in Iraqi Kurdistan and no sense of bending backwards to fight their ethnic brethren to satisfy the vain nationalist desires of a neighboring country who even refuses to acknowledge them as a credible entity.
It is more ironic that Turkey sees the PKK as a terrorist threat and not as a Kurdish problem. Violence is not a solution and never an adequate substitute for diplomacy; however, Turkey has a much bigger problem than a few thousand rebels. It may be painful to concede, but Turkey has a huge restive Kurdish population and if Turkey does not tender its next steps correctly and advocate a greater solution to its long-standing Kurdish headache, this will only exasperate tensions beyond what it currently perceives as a problem.
The PKK is simply the fruit from the seeds of problems that were sewn decades previously in the aftermath of World War I. Unless the root of these problems are addressed, the branches may be cut under all the pretexts that one can imagine; however, they will only grow back at a more vicious rate. If the PKK as an organization is hypothetically eradicated all together, there is no guarantee that another Kurdish offshoot will not arise by next year.
It is time for the Turkish regime to stop an impractical game of incongruous politics and recognize the existence of the Iraqi Kurdish administration. They cannot preserve their stability without the help of the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi Kurds are unable to survive without Turkish help.
Turkey will never solve the PKK dilemma through ignorance or arrogance. Although rebel actions and their presence in northern Iraq create leverage for negotiations on either side, ultimately PKK violence and insurgency will never benefit the greater Turkish Kurdish population. In the great global battle against terrorism, such actions in the present era will hardly strike the right sentiments of international opinion that is vital in winning concessions and achieving success.
The need for a reality check
Turkey must finally open its eyes and realize that after decades of fighting the ghosts of its past legacies and outdated ideals, it will never win this battle against Kurdish nationalism until it takes a firm reality check.
The recent majority Kurdish vote for Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Party of Justice and Development is proof that Turkey Kurds can be swayed into playing a supportive and productive role in a new Turkey, and they must be embraced with open arms into forging new brotherly ties for the benefit of the greater Turkish state, whilst accepting the emergence of a Kurdish entity in Iraq, not as a choice but as a natural eventuality that cannot be stopped no matter how much they delay its end.
This is simply the wrongs of the past correcting themselves-it was always inevitable that all the explosive seeds that were planted by the artificial creation of the Middle East could never remain underground forever. Unfortunately for the Middle East, the wave of change is not over and will continue. There are far too many volcanoes waiting to erupt from Iran to Lebanon and possibly beyond.
As for Turkey, it is like fighting a tidal wave that you know will sweep you ashore, but rather than fight a storm that will eventually prove costly and counterproductive, you must use the tides of the stream to ensure maximum gains and benefit and the least painful of landings.
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