Kurdish Ministers Woo U.S Oil Firms Regional Bid Angers Iraqi Government

By Steven Mufson
Washington Post Staff Writer
November 28, 2007

Two top Kurdish leaders are a long way from the mountains of northern Iraq this week.

On Monday night, Omer Fattah Hussain was the toast of a dinner held at the 10,000-square-foot McLean mansion of Ed Rogers, a Reagan White House political director and current chairman of the lobbying firm Barbour Griffith & Rogers. In an opulent living room just off an art-filled entryway with a curved double stairway, the deputy prime minister of the Iraqi Kurds' autonomous region mingled with such luminaries as former assistant secretary of defense Richard Perle, former White House aide I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby and former White House press secretary Tony Snow.

Today, Hussain travels to Houston with Ashti Abdullah Hawrami, the Kurdish regional oil minister, to woo an even more important audience: U.S. oil companies.

After more than a year of political deadlock in Iraq over a national petroleum law, the Kurdistan Regional Government unanimously adopted its own petroleum legislation in August. In the past month, it has signed a dozen oil exploration contracts and hopes that foreign firms will ultimately invest $10 billion in the oil sector and bring 1 million barrels a day of new oil production from the Kurdish region over the next five years.

"Everyone is lining up . . . saying 'I want a piece of this action,' " said Hawrami, who hopes to complete negotiations on two more deals in Houston.

Hawrami said the contracts posed no conflict with Iraq's federal constitution. The Iraqi central government, however, is irate over the Kurdish contracts -- and the State Department isn't happy either. The Bush administration has been striving mightily over the past year to get a national petroleum law approved before international firms jump in.

In addition, a group of 60 Iraqi oil professionals signed a letter saying that the recent Kurdish contracts were a "dangerous step that has no legal or political standing whatsoever." Iraqi oil union leaders have also opposed the contracts.

Earlier this month, Iraqi oil minister Hussein Shahristani called the deals illegal. He warned that foreign oil companies that sign contracts with the Kurdish authorities without central government approval risk retaliation when seeking stakes in the bigger oil prospects in the southern part of the country. There are 51 known but undeveloped fields in Iraq.

Several major international oil companies have been talking to Baghdad about resuming work in the same giant southern fields where they had worked when Saddam Hussein was in power. And the central government indicated to them that it might rely on Hussein-era oil laws or offer service contracts if the new petroleum legislation is delayed, according to Kamal Field Aldasri, an economic adviser to the Iraqi government.

Aldasri said recently that the central government wants help in finding ways to boost output at the 27 operating oil fields throughout Iraq, which are producing well below their potential. The Kirkuk field, for example, used to produce almost 1 million barrels a day and now produces less than 200,000. The government's aims to boost production from the current 2.2 million barrels a day to 3 million, though it is running far behind schedule.

The major oil companies have been giving advice, reviewing data and training Iraqi oil workers -- without compensation. Royal Dutch Shell Group, for example, is drawing up a master plan for tapping for domestic consumption the more than 600 million cubic feet a day of natural gas now being burned off. Exxon Mobil, Chevron, BP and Total are also doing technical studies, industry sources say.

But given political uncertainty, legal disputes and security risks, the big international firms are not prepared to reenter the country with their own personnel.

An official of one major oil company, who spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid compromising talks with central or regional Iraqi officials, said: "Frankly, I don't think there are any opportunities at the moment in northern Iraq that are appropriate for a company [of our] size. . . . They're too small."

Smaller firms, however, have rushed to sign exploration and production contracts there. They include affiliates of Russia's Alfa-Access-Renovo group, India's Reliance Industries, the Korea National Oil Corp. and Austria's major oil firm, OMV.

Asked about the absence of major oil companies, Hawrami said TNK-BP had signed a contract. BP said that it was not involved but that its Russian partner had entered the agreement on its own.

Some of the recent signing activity may have begun when Dallas-based Hunt Oil, whose chief executive Ray L. Hunt is a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and a major contributor to Bush's campaigns, signed a contract in September. Smaller U.S. companies have followed suit.

The Hunt contract upset the State Department, which has been pressing Iraq to adopt a petroleum law that would delineate the division of authority between the central and regional governments.

In a Sept. 28 meeting with the Washington representatives of major oil companies, two State Department officials insisted that the Bush administration's policy was that U.S. companies should not sign separate deals with the Kurdistan Regional Government without approval from the central government in Baghdad.

According to one person at the meeting, the officials warned that some of the blocs being offered by the Kurdish government lay outside its territory and might extend into Turkey or Iran. While conceding that the Hunt deal did not violate any U.S. law, they said it created an "unfortunate and untimely" impression that the U.S. government was changing its position on the need for a national petroleum law.

Reports surfaced nearly a year ago that central and regional authorities were close to a deal on the law, but no agreement has been reached. The key issues in dispute are the types and terms of contracts offered to foreign companies, whether the central or regional governments have the power to sign contracts, what portion of revenue flows to the central government, the composition of a federal commission empowered to review contracts, and whether the committee that distributes oil receipts is part of the central finance ministry or an independent group.

Some Iraqis accuse the Kurdish regional authorities of giving overly generous terms to foreign oil companies in production-sharing agreements. In those agreements, a foreign firm takes on all the risk of exploration but gets a share of production if it finds oil.

Hawrami said the foreign firms would get no more than 15 percent of production under recent contracts and less if the regional government chooses to take a one-quarter stake in the venture after oil is found. He said contracts in relatively peaceful areas would offer smaller percentages to foreign companies.

Production from fields in the Kurdish area would be exported through a pipeline that goes through Turkey, Hawrami said. The pipeline, which has been damaged by frequent explosions, carried 300,000 barrels a day in October, an improvement some industry experts attribute to increased patrols by Kurdish militia and Iraqi helicopter monitoring.

Hawrami said that Shahristani's threats against firms that sign contracts in the Kurdish region were counterproductive and that delays were costing Iraq money. "We don't need his approval," Hawrami said. "Every time we hear the word 'illegal,' we sign two more contracts."

Italian minister warns a Kurdish invasion would be a "disaster"

Istanbul, (AKI) -

Italian foreign minister Massimo D'Alema has warned Turkey against kind of military occupation of the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq. Such an occupation would be a "disaster" D'Alema said during a two-day visit to Turkey.

"Focused, limited military action by Turkey would be considered acceptable, especially with an agreement by Iraqi authorities," D'Alema said during an interview aired on the Turkish TV channel, Canal D, on Wednesday.

"But an occupation of northern Iraq would be unacceptable, a disaster for Turkey as well."

D'Alema was referring to the possibility of a military attack by Turkish forces on bases of separatists from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), in the mountains on the border of Turkey and Iraq.

His comments came as two US generals assured Turkey on Wednesday that the PKK would be eliminated by May next year.

During the interview, D'Alema said authorities in Ankara should recall the Israeli-Lebanese experience of July 2006, when Israeli troops invaded Lebanon to respond to attacks from Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah guerrillas. The crisis the July war unleashed in both countries was still unresolved, D'Alema noted.

D'Alema said the solution to the intensified attacks by the PKK "cannot only be military, but should also be political".

Referring to moves to close the Democratic Society Party (DTP) which has 21 members in parliament and is accused of being too close to the PKK, he said such a move would send " a very dangerous message".

The DTP is a pro-Kurdish nationalist political party in Turkey, considered by many as the political wing of the PKK.

Turkish media reported two top generals of the US army have assured Turkey that the PKK will be wiped out in 2008.

Sources told the Turkish daily Today's Zaman that Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the US Joint chiefs of staff, and Gen. David Petraeus, the top US commander in Iraq, gave their word that cooperation between Turkey and the US would flush out terrorists by May, 2008.

In a meeting with Turkish deputy chief of general staff Gen. Ergin Saygun and general staff chief of operations Gen. Nusret Tasdelen in the capital, Ankara, Cartwright and Petraeus evaluated the success of the real-time intelligence flow provided to Turkey by the US.

The two countries had agreed to share intelligence on the PKK after US President George W. Bush and prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met in Washington earlier this month.

The two US generals expressed their opinion that cooperation between the two countries against terrorism would yield positive results soon.

Human rights in Syria. How is it to live paralyzed by fear?

by Nicolien den Boer
Radio Netherlands

Nov 23, 2007

Being afraid for your own safety is one thing, worrying about the safety of your family can paralyse you with fear. This is why some human rights activists in Syria decide to throw in the towel. However, most activists continue to fight for what they believe even if both they and their families face threats, imprisonment and torture.

One evening Husam left a Damascus bar after having had one too many drinks. He took a taxi home and started to chat with the driver, who began criticising Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Husam enthusiastically joined the driver in criticising the president. It was a lot of fun to secretly poke fun at the regime in the taxi, with the windows closed.

Suddenly the taxi took a wrong turn. Husam was taken to a police station, arrested and sentenced to several months in prison for insulting the president.

Human rights lawyer and activist Razan Zeitouneh tells the story in her Damascus home. Many Syrian human rights activists can tell similar anecdotes. Taxi drivers have a reputation for working for the Mukhabarat (the secret police), but your neighbour or fellow student can also turn out to be a secret agent. It is not easy to recognise them, which is why there is so much paranoia in Syria.

Like mushrooms

Syrian human rights activists are used to living in fear. During the regime of former president and dictator Hafez al-Assad many human rights activists were jailed for decades and often tortured. It seemed that things would change when his son Bashir succeeded him in 2000.

The new president promised more freedom and democracy. Human rights activists started to collect petitions calling for more freedoms. They also held demonstrations, and new groups have sprouted like mushrooms. However, the Human Rights Watch organisation reports that in recent years activists have been rounded up in one wave of arrests after another. In 2006, seven young human rights activists were sentenced to up to seven years in jail.

Fear and concern
Razan Zeitouneh, who was arrested last year, says the human rights movement has been paralysed by fear. Her organisation, the Damascus Centre for Human Rights Studies conducts research into the situation in Syria. Ms Zeitouneh interviewed other human rights activists. She concluded that there were two dominant feelings: fear and concern about those close to you:
"The fear returns every time you're arrested or someone close to you is arrested or tortured. But the fear also gradually fades away. However, concern about your family stays and can paralyse you completely."

It's a tried and tested method of keeping someone under one's thumb. Threatening a member of someone's family is like having the person in the hands of the police.

"You've got to learn to live with the concern, because you never get rid of it. Your first step is to recognise it. You must let it become part of you. And you must understand that there are other emotions. This gives you the perseverance you will need to continue your work."
Practical protection

Human rights activist Ammar Qurabi, former member of an outlawed Syrian opposition party, says he has been arrested six times. On the telephone he proposes to meet in the busy lobby of a hotel in Damascus. Wouldn't he prefer a quieter place? "Why? I'm not afraid!"

In the lobby, Qurabi tells he is no longer allowed to leave the country. He knows no fear, he says with a smile,
"Because the secret services are becoming bored with reading all of my e-mails and reports."

His organisation reports on issues such as women's rights and the Kurdish minority in Syria. Incidentally, Qurabi enjoys a certain measure of protection because of his contacts with Amnesty International, among other organisations. He is known as a good international networker, creating a bit of security for himself. Yet another prison term for Qurabi would be guaranteed to make international headlines.
"Morons"

Some human rights activists possess a remarkable mechanism for self-protection: their sense of relativity. The agents of the Mukharabat? They don't frighten the activists. Most of them are 'morons' anyway, they say, referring to the barely-qualified taxi drivers acting as secret agents.

Even a 30-year prison term is something to be philosophical about, as human rights activist Mustapha demonstrates, pointing at a house as he gets out of a taxi in Damascus.

"See that house over there? That's where a friend of mine lives. He was in prison for 30 years, but he has still got a zest for life. Thirty years, it is terribly long, but you know, you may be tortured at first, but later you spend so much time with your warders, they can't help but becoming your friends. Then it's not so bad."

Why American troops belong in Kurdistan

USA Today, Opinion

By Lionel Beehner

November 21, 2007

ZAKHO, Iraq — To shuttle between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan as an American is to feel both liked and loathed: Liked because you are crossing a border separating the two most pro-American people in the Muslim world, and loathed because the United States hasn't done enough to defuse the tension between the two sides. Should war erupt, Washington could come to regret its hands-off approach. Full Text

AKP Condemns Judicial Attempts to Close Kurdish Party

Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor

By Gareth Jenkins

November 19, 2007

Leading members of Turkey 's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) have condemned attempts by the country's judiciary to close down the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). Full Text

Turkish courts wrestle with Kurdish problem under EU spotlight

By Andrew Finkel

November 19, 007

A delegation of European MPs to Ankara this week is expected to urge Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to speak out against the possible closure of a political party with strong Kurdish nationalist roots.

This latest challenge to Turkey-EU relations follows action by the chief prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals to open a case against the Democratic Society Party (DTP) on grounds that is pursuing a separatist agenda. If successful, the prosecution would force the expulsion of 20 DTP deputies from Parliament and deprive many of the party's mayors and local councilors of office. Full Text

raqi parliament opens probe into delays over status of northern oil-rich Kirkuk

Africa & Middle East

Associated Press

November 17, 2007

Baghdad - Iraq 's parliament on Saturday ordered an inquiry into the delay of a referendum over whether the oil-rich city of Kirkuk will join the semiautonomous Kurdish region in the north. Full Text

Struggling against the changing times: the real Issue for Turkey is not 3,000 rebels, but 15 million Kurds

Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel - Kurdish Globe

Fighting the branches of your problem is fruitless, without addressing its root.

Authorization of military action
On October 17, the Turkish Parliament passed a controversial motion that effectively allowed the Turkish military a year's pass to launch incursions into northern Iraq as it sees fit, under the pretext of preserving national security and eradicating the long-standing PKK threat emanating from the Qandil Mountains of the Kurdistan region.
Despite strong objections from Iraq, the U.S. administration, NATO, the EU, and a plethora of major States, Turkey approved the bill in defiance. With a huge occupation force in the shape of the U.S. Army still on the ground, this hardly gives a positive image of Iraqi sovereignty and may well set a benchmark for future invasions by neighbors.
Turkey's battle with the PKK is not new. In fact, Turkey has been waging war on the PKK for 28 years in the impoverished and largely neglected lands of southeastern Turkey. This war reached a peak in the mid-1990s, culminating in a series of large cross-border campaigns by the Turkish military to oust rebel bases across the porous borders.
Clearly, these campaigns did no significant damage to the PKK nor did they eradicate the threat, even as those campaigns were supported by some Iraqi Kurdish parties at the time. However, although five years of unilateral truce by the PKK on the back of the arrest of their leader, Abdullah Ocalan, resulted in some peace and a motion to readdress its adverse international image, the PKK made very little political gains with the Turkish government persistent in its refusal to negotiate with their 'terrorist' arch-nemesis or issue amnesty.
Feeling lost and weary on the back of the dramatic arrest and trial of their revered leader, the influence and power of the PKK steadily dropped. However, clearly the onset of the Iraqi liberation in 2003 and the newfound prominence and political stature of the Iraqi Kurds served to embolden PKK desire and reignited their passion for making another stand against the Turkish regime.
Clearly, this time the PKK has more political coverage than ever before along with broader media attention. The status of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is now enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution and widely recognized by major global powers. Arguably, the long-standing rivalry with the PKK became second nature to a Turkish state that long-denied its substantial Kurdish population cultural and linguistic rights and before that systematic denial altogether, but now to its horror was witnessing a strong Kurdish national renaissance a stone's throw across the border.

Iraqi Kurds-the real Turkish danger
It is likely that with parliamentary approval of military incursions valid for one year, this will give the Turkish state time to maneuver and watch the KRG closely with an upcoming decisive year that will determine the future of Iraq. The ideal scenario for Turkey would be to maintain a long-term foothold and influence over northern Iraq, rather than attack at will.
Under a period of self-rule, the Iraqi Kurds have grown from strength to strength, witnessing an economic boom, status as key strategic allies to the U.S. administration and widely acknowledged as the only island of peace and prosperity in the mess that is Iraq. Whilst Kurdish confidence has reached alarming new heights for the Turkish state, which as of today still refuses to recognize the Kurdish administration or negotiate with them on an official level, many of the red lines set by the Turkish government have long passed with the Iraqi Kurds hungry and determined to bolster their status and political gains further.
In the year officially set for a referendum on the status of oil-rich Kirkuk, frequent Turkish calls for the abandonment of such a momentous milestone have gone unheard. Turkey has lobbied with the Iraqi government extensively to dismiss the referendum out-of-hand or at least delay it indefinitely citing various concerns. In contrast this has only increased Kurdish determination and desire and with the knowledge that they are almost certain victors in any vote they have pressed on without fear.
Undoubtedly, Turkey and the surrounding neighbors fear that if Kurdish aspirations are unchecked, this may well create an unstoppable ripple affect for the millions of Kurds inhabiting those countries.
Although, the PKK issue has acted as the focal point in channeling Turkish fears, the presence of an estimated 3,000 rebels in the rugged mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan is clearly a side issue to the greater concerns of the ramifications of the potential destabilization affect of 15 million Turkish Kurds.

Prospects of a full-scale invasion
Clearly, launching any military incursion into Iraq may well backfire. The PKK rebels will disperse into Kurdish towns and villages and even major air raids may lack the effectiveness of getting the job done. A highly unpopular Turkish invasion will only encourage support and sympathy for the PKK amongst Iraqi Kurds.
Any major incursion deep into KRG territory may well induce direct confrontation with the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, which is likely to only deepen the issue and increase the risk of an all-out Turkish-Kurdish war.
As a result of these factors, a full-scale invasion in reality is unlikely and much more costly than the limited gains it may provide. Alienating Kurdish populations on either side of the border who heavily rely on one another for billion of dollars in trade is political and economical suicide. This motion, for the time being, at least, is more sabre-rattling and show of power and intent. It is designed to further pressurize the U.S. and Iraqi governments into action and warn the Iraqi Kurds of the dangers of defiance, harboring the PKK, or continuing separatist ambitions.

Changing political climate
Turkey has long accused the U.S. administration of not doing enough to tackle the PKK issue and has called on the Iraqi government to take action.
However, the key problem with any U.S. action to deal with the PKK is the potential to undermine their strong relationship with the Iraqi Kurds and destabilize the only stable part of Iraq. Noticeably, for a Turkey suffering from a dramatic decline of their traditional closeness with the U.S., this is seen as preferential treatment of the Kurds and double standards in the fight against terrorism.
The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan by U.S. forces and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon last year set a dangerous precedent for superpowers combating terrorism and threats against national security. Turkey feels it is no exception to the rule and only wider strategic and political implications stopped it from invading in 2003 to dispel Kurdish drive toward power and the expansion of their region.
However, events in the last year and more recently have irked Turkey beyond care of the repercussions of their actions. First, Turkey introduced mild reforms and introduced more cultural tolerance of their Kurdish minority under EU accession talks. However, despite what it perceived as more than a gesture of goodwill, the reforms on the back of EU pressure did not continue apace. Talks have all but stalled and the divide has only deepened with major reservations from key European nations over the potential influx of millions of largely impoverished Muslims into their Christian super club.
Turkey, in its gradual changing political stance and its fast emerging ties with the controversial governments in Syria and Iran, has seemingly all but given up on the idea of an imminent entry into the European Union and turned its attention to its more immediate concerns. Turkish public opinion has hardly helped, as a strong sense of nationalism has kicked in over the Iraqi Kurdish calls of defiance, frequent PKK attacks, and the fast-declining popularity of the U.S. in the country.

Turkish-U.S. ties under strain
Whilst the frequently failed promises by the U.S. administration to deal with the PKK hardly helped, two events that arguably swayed Turkish political opinion and deep-rooted anxiety into overdrive was their disappointment over a U.S. Senate motion, referred to as the Biden-Brownback amendment, to push through the break-up of Iraq into three federal entities; then, there was their downright anger over the passing of a non-binding resolution by the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee to officially recognize the Armenian massacre between 1915-1923 under Ottoman rule as genocide.
This created uproar in public, political, and military circles alike, with Turkey swiftly condemning the resolution and warning President Bush of the massive ramifications that this would have in their relationship and their logistical support of U.S. troops in Iraq, if the resolution was formally passed.
Similar moves by France caused similar rage and ended military ties between both nations.
Turkey is moving through a time of great sensitivity and fears that perhaps they can only rely on themselves in the present era. The changing face of the political and strategic makeup of the Middle East and international focus has rocked Turkey's once unbreakable alliance with the U.S., reaching a peak at the time of the Cold War. However, the U.S. has greater priorities than ever before and faces its gravest danger in the form of terrorism.
The global aspects and wider implications of their foreign policies are more important than any relationship with a single country.

Iraqi Kurds bypassed
The region and the international community are now watching closely at Turkey's next steps. What is clear, however, is that Turkey's next steps must be taken cautiously and wisely. Any hasty or controversial adventure that goes beyond the remit of a limited incursion may well result in a major backlash.
The Iraqi Kurds, keen as ever to strike friendly and productive terms, fully appreciate that for their long-term prosperity and survival they must cooperate very closely with Turkey. However, even they are feeling increasingly undermined by the actions of regional powers and the insistence of Turkey in bypassing them in negotiations with the Iraqi government.
A recently signed security deal between Iraq and Turkey bypassed the Iraqi Kurds directly with the Baghdad government insistent that all elements of national foreign policy must be channeled through them.
However, evidently the region at the focus of the debate is the Kurdish administration. Turkey will be effectively invading the autonomous KRG region and as such violating their rights and sovereignty directly.
It is ironic that a nation that refuses to recognize a political entity would directly invade their area of jurisdiction and expect to bypass them as any matter of importance.
Despite the rhetoric of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Turkey's ignorance, there is nothing that Baghdad can do in the Kurdish region. There is no Iraqi Army in Iraqi Kurdistan and no sense of bending backwards to fight their ethnic brethren to satisfy the vain nationalist desires of a neighboring country who even refuses to acknowledge them as a credible entity.

PKK-a terrorist issue or a Kurdish problem
It is more ironic that Turkey sees the PKK as a terrorist threat and not as a Kurdish problem. Violence is not a solution and never an adequate substitute for diplomacy; however, Turkey has a much bigger problem than a few thousand rebels. It may be painful to concede, but Turkey has a huge restive Kurdish population and if Turkey does not tender its next steps correctly and advocate a greater solution to its long-standing Kurdish headache, this will only exasperate tensions beyond what it currently perceives as a problem.
The PKK is simply the fruit from the seeds of problems that were sewn decades previously in the aftermath of World War I. Unless the root of these problems are addressed, the branches may be cut under all the pretexts that one can imagine; however, they will only grow back at a more vicious rate. If the PKK as an organization is hypothetically eradicated all together, there is no guarantee that another Kurdish offshoot will not arise by next year.
It is time for the Turkish regime to stop an impractical game of incongruous politics and recognize the existence of the Iraqi Kurdish administration. They cannot preserve their stability without the help of the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi Kurds are unable to survive without Turkish help.
Turkey will never solve the PKK dilemma through ignorance or arrogance. Although rebel actions and their presence in northern Iraq create leverage for negotiations on either side, ultimately PKK violence and insurgency will never benefit the greater Turkish Kurdish population. In the great global battle against terrorism, such actions in the present era will hardly strike the right sentiments of international opinion that is vital in winning concessions and achieving success.

The need for a reality check
Turkey must finally open its eyes and realize that after decades of fighting the ghosts of its past legacies and outdated ideals, it will never win this battle against Kurdish nationalism until it takes a firm reality check.
The recent majority Kurdish vote for Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Party of Justice and Development is proof that Turkey Kurds can be swayed into playing a supportive and productive role in a new Turkey, and they must be embraced with open arms into forging new brotherly ties for the benefit of the greater Turkish state, whilst accepting the emergence of a Kurdish entity in Iraq, not as a choice but as a natural eventuality that cannot be stopped no matter how much they delay its end.
This is simply the wrongs of the past correcting themselves-it was always inevitable that all the explosive seeds that were planted by the artificial creation of the Middle East could never remain underground forever. Unfortunately for the Middle East, the wave of change is not over and will continue. There are far too many volcanoes waiting to erupt from Iran to Lebanon and possibly beyond.
As for Turkey, it is like fighting a tidal wave that you know will sweep you ashore, but rather than fight a storm that will eventually prove costly and counterproductive, you must use the tides of the stream to ensure maximum gains and benefit and the least painful of landings.

Overview of Turkish military operations

Thursday, 01 November 2007,

Reear Karim

Rebwar Karim

Turkish military continues preparations for more strikes within the region.

Globe correspondent Rebwar Karim Wali believes that all Turkish military operations are "paving the way for the Army to declare a temporary government that addresses its best interests and to replace the AKP party."
Despite international pressure, Turkey prepares for its 24th operation inside Kurdistan region. Turkey staged its first military action on the PKK on May 26, 1983. Then, Turkey brought 10,000 soldiers 25 miles inside Iraqi land to attack the PKK. Though this operation was carried out in accord with the former Iraqi system, no military agreement was signed between Iraq and Turkey at that time. After more than a year, in October 1984, Baghdad signed an agreement with Ankara, and Ankara orchestrated the same agreement with Iran after a month. But the Turkish troops never trespassed upon the Iranian borders as they did with Iraq. The last military incursion into Kurdistan by Turkey was in 1997. After arresting Abdullah Ocalan and weakening the PKK, Turkish military operations outside their borders eased up. Their military began threatening Iran rather than striking the PKK. Turkey considered the Kurdish circumstances of that time as temporary. The best they scenario they saw was that Saddam would conquer the Kurdistan region again, and the worst was that the Kurds would gain limited autonomy but Baghdad would still be in charge of their authority. Neither of these happened after the fall of the former Iraqi system in 2003. Then, Kurdistan region and its new reality became a part of the long-term political conflict in Turkey between that country's Islamic and secular parts. Such a dispute has never been debated like it is today, and all the secularists' positions have been invaded by Islamic sides except the Army and the MIT (Turkish National Intelligence Organization); the others are all in Islamic hands.
What Turkey is doing now is just the result of an internal problem rather than the PKK. It's a dispute between the Kemalist secularists and Islamic technocrats, and the equation is easy: If all PKK leaders are submitted to Turkey or if there is a crackdown on all PKK guerrillas-though the Turkish army would never do such a favor to Erdogan's government-do the current political struggles in Turkey come to an end?
The Turkish Army did not want to create problems for the government on changing the constitution, because they did not want to make it ugly. Meanwhile, the constitutional draft prepared by the AKP is a good justification to strike this party. The Army focused on the PKK and the Kurdistan region in order to make its deeds legislative on the country, not on account of authority. The country will be lost, not the sovereignty!
It is too late. The Turkish government and the authoritarian party are entrapped, and the government knows well that by dethroning the PKK, the problem does not end-it just stalls. By looking at the 1997 experience, the Turkish Army bankrupted the Islamic government of Najmaddin Arbakan and created another government, and it is not out of the question to believe that the same scenario of the past 10 years repeats itself. If the Turkish Army enters Kurdistan in any way, the Turkish government will face a great loss. Turkey will have no success. Whether or not Turkey stages the military strike, a part of the Turkish government is still in the hands of the Army. The Turkish government must pay back $117 million in debt and will be under more stress. All of this is paving the way for the Army to declare a temporary government that addresses its best interests and to replace the AKP party; it lost the Kurdish vote in other elections and any previous gains made by this party are now lost. What the Turkish government is doing now doesn't coincide with the real politics of the AKP, and all its announcements are an attempt to rescue itself from stress. America is a part of it because it has never forgotten that Turkey refused to let it use Turkish lands to strike Iraq, while Iran previously let America use its sky to strike Afghanistan! And so, America does not need the AKP for its future goals, and manages to rankle Turkey in many different ways. America tries to bring together both the Kurds and the Turkish government. But, a government take on office by the Army's willingness can befriend Kurds while it is impossible for a government that aims to destroy the Army. Thus, the renewing of the Turkish political struggles benefits Kurds, and the more it exists, the better it is for the Kurds.

The neighbour in berserk fury

Thursday, 01 November 2007,

A Turkish soldier patrols the area near the Turkey-Iraq border

By Behrooz Shojai

The Turkish authorities, particularly its powerful military are in berserk mode since the heavy losses in an ambush by PKK soldiers in northern border areas.

The Turkish authorities, particularly its powerful military are in berserk mode since the heavy losses in an ambush by PKK soldiers in northern border areas. This is not the first time that the Turks sustain heavy losses; the new about it is Turkey's threats of assault against Kurdistan region. When watching the Turkish media one can get the impression that Mr. Barzani, the president of Kurdistan Region is in charge even for PKK and it was by his orders that the Turkish soldiers were attacked by PKK. The Turkish media, alongside with some prominent cabinet members, take the liberty to give Kurdish leaders the most obscene sobriquets.
They have been here before and they did not solve the problem that now faces them, although by then they had complete freedom to do it. What has changed since then? If they could not finish the "job" then how can they do it now? If they really want to do it!
The last election in Turkey was preceded by anti-AKP and pro-army gigantic rallies. The AKP won the election and had initially major amendments to the Turkish constitution and reforms in consideration. Strikingly, the AKP became target for both army and PKK, simultaneously! The army pushed for an invention of Kurdistan region, which resulted in the parliament bill to give the army free hands; and very soon after, several Turkish soldiers are killed, wounded and captured in a PKK ambush; the most comprehensive in a decay. The Turks were badly in need of a good excuse and PKK served them with such; but the picture is more complicated. PKK does not represent a united will; there are some tendencies within PKK that advocate confrontation. They are more concerned about the survival of the organization and their self-realization than the Kurdish national interests, including the achievements in South. Alongside the infiltration from outside, the fluid identity of its heavily assimilated high functionaries can constitute a major fact behind PKK's prevalent political discourse and practice. Similar to Turkey's so called deep-state, PKK's own deep-state would benefit - even economically - from a confrontation. Not surprisingly the economical support for PKK among the Kurdish Diaspora has increased trebly last days! These agencies within PKK are using Kurdish national sentiments for obscure intentions. One can just hope that moderate people, with commitment to Kurdish national interests could get in charge within PKK.
And the Turkish authorities should reconsider their current political discourse based on denial and hectoring people around, particularly the Kurds. Their hot temper and obscene language can only be considered as lack of self-confidence. The Ottoman Grandpa is buried somewhere in the history; his heir, the Republic with prolonged teenage, should grow up one day. With this political culture intertwined with racism, physical and symbolic violence Turks have scanty chance to become EU-members. EU membership is not just economical cooperation; it also means a set of values based on respect for human rights, tolerance, democracy and civility.

Since the beginning of 90s the Kurds have been blessed by their adversaries' stupidity; Saddam's invasion of Kuwait is best example. If Turkey wishes to tread in Saddam's footsteps, it will face the same fate. Circumstances now are different than 90s when Turkish army could easily strut in and out of the region.
Any attempts by our neighbours to stop our just cause will intensify our motivation to get where we have aimed. Running berserk and further losses are going to push us forward, not preventing us.

Turkey’s Iraq Problem

Friday, November 2, 2007

> Breaking news

Friday, November 2, 2007

> Breaking news

By David L. Phillips.

November 1, 2007

PRIME MINISTER Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey is under tremendous pressure to act decisively against the Kurdistan Workers' Party. He should resist demands for military action. Attacking the PKK in Northern Iraq would have serious repercussions, undermining Turkey 's democratic development, radicalizing Turkish Kurds, and risking a regional conflagration while adversely affecting relations between the United States and Turkey , as well as Turkey 's candidacy for membership in the European Union.

The PKK launched its armed struggle in 1978 with the goal of ending repression and establishing "Greater Kurdistan," encompassing territory in Turkey , Iran , Iraq , and Syria . The Turkish state responded by declaring a state of emergency in the Kurdish areas of Southeastern Turkey and cracking down with its military. Up to 30,000 people died in the ensuing conflict. Full Text

Turkey falling behind on political reform, EU Report says

By Lucia Kubosova

November 2, 2007

BRUSSELS - Almost one year after the EU partially froze Turkey 's membership talks, little reform progress has been made by Ankara in key areas, with the European Commission in a fresh report urging Ankara "to renew the momentum of political reforms."

A commission draft report to be published on Tuesday (6 November) - seen by EUobserver - concludes that "the implementation of reforms was uneven and has slowed down since 2005" when Turkey kicked off EU accession negotiations. Full Text

Iraqi Kurds taking care of business

OAKLAND ROSS/TORONTO STAR

Many attending trade fair in Erbil, Iraq, this week adopt Western dress.

Annual trade show attracts firms from 20 countries as construction booms while war rages in south

Nov 01, 2007

By Oakland Ross

November 1, 2007

ERBIL, Iraq –The fires of civil war continue to rage south of this rambling, low-rise regional capital, and now military tensions are mounting to the north as well, along the rebel-infested border between Iraq and Turkey .

But here in sunny, ancient Erbil , they're having a trade show – and Hogr Salih Qadir, for one, is feeling pretty good about it. Full Text

Dreams and reality

November 1, 2007

The effects of northern Iraq on Turkey 's Kurds are more complex than they seem STANDING by the stream that separates the hamlet of Ovakoy from northern Iraq , Hisyar Ozalp, a young Kurdish lawyer, gestures towards a cluster of pink houses on the opposite bank. “That is Kurdistan ,” he says. “And so is this.” Any conversation in Ovakoy shows why Turkey is so nervous about the effect of the Iraqi Kurds' semi-independent statelet. “I don't like Turkish, it's no good,” declares Fatma, a five-year-old, using the commonest Kurdish dialect. A gaggle of Turkish conscripts stares in mute incomprehension. Full Text

For Kurds In N. Iraq , A Familiar Foreboding

By Sudarsan Raghavan
November 1, 2007
Shelling by Turkey Leads Many to Flee DESHTETEK -- The last three women left this tiny hamlet on Monday, carrying no more than their clothes and prayers. They joined 250 villagers who fled in the past two weeks, locking their homes and their yellow church and driving away on a desolate road scarred by war. Only 11 men remain, their lands separated from Turkey by a thin, emerald river winding through a fertile valley. For several months now, Turkish forces have been shelling this rugged terrain from mountain bases, including a massive one perched above Deshtetek, in an effort to root out Kurdish guerrillas. An immense Turkish flag, its white crescent and star gleaming in the sun, is painted on the mountainside.

Full Text

Kurds in Turkey Who Backed Erdogan Now Fear Civil War

By Ayla Jean Yackley

November 1, 2007

Kurds in southeast Turkey voted this summer in record numbers for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his promise to bring peace to their region. Now, with Turkish troops massed for a possible invasion of Iraq , the talk is of curtailed political rights and ethnic strife. Full Text

Lost and Found in Kurdistan

Ottawa Citizen

By Susan Mohammad

October 26, 2007

It has been 18 years, but the anger I felt toward my father is still fresh.

It was Remembrance Day, 1989. To mark the occasion at Queen Elizabeth Public School in Kitchener, Ont., a few children with very ethnic names were invited to give a speech. Although only seven, I was chosen to speak at the school assembly. But as the ceremony drew near, I couldn't think of anything to say. I asked my father, an Iraqi-Kurd, for help. He was the smartest person I knew. Full Text

Kurdish intellectual Fırat: Turkey should recognize the Iraqi Kurdish administration

October 29, 2007

Kurdish intellectual Ümit Fırat believes Turkey should abandon its policy of rejecting the Iraqi Kurdish administration and start implementing immediate social and political reforms immediately instead of resorting to military options to end the terrorism of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Full Text

In the Rugged North of Iraq , Kurdish Rebels Flout Turkey

By Sabrina Tavernise

October 29, 2007

RANIYA, Iraq, Oct. 27 — A low-slung concrete building off a steep mountain road marks the beginning of rebel territory in this remote corner of northern Iraq . The fighters based here, Kurdish militants fighting Turkey , fly their own flag, and despite urgent international calls to curb them, they operate freely, receiving supplies in beat-up pickup trucks less than 10 miles from a government checkpoint.

“Our condition is good,” said one fighter, putting a heaping spoonful of sugar into his steaming tea. “How about yours?” A giant face of the rebels’ leader — Abdullah Ocalan, now in a Turkish prison — has been painted on a nearby slope. Full Text

Behind Turkey’s Kurdish Problem

By Pelin Turgut

October 24, 2007

Istanbul – For as long as I can remember, I have been taught — in school, on TV, by taxi drivers — that Turkey has "red lines" that cannot be crossed, sacrosanct rules dictating foreign policy that have been passed down through generations as if written in stone. At their anxious heart, these rules are the legacy of the 1920s, when — following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire — Europeans were trying to carve up the country. But a ragtag bunch of Turkish volunteers, poorly armed, famously surviving on a slice of stale bread a day, rallied under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to fight a war of independence. Against tremendous odds, they won, and from their struggle, modern Turkey was born. But the paranoia of having almost been conquered runs strong — gut-wrenchingly strong, summed up in the popular saying "A Turk has no friend but the Turks." The world, if you ask a Turk, is out to get us, and our challenge is to remain steadfast against enemies real and imagined. Hence the red lines on everything from vigilant secularism to Kurdish autonomy. Full Text