Wednesday, 10 October 2007,
Southern Kurdistan, due to its internal and international political position, can foster and work towards a civil and democratic society.
Azad Aslan
Political Editor
Political Editor
lowing World War I, Kurdish nationalism has failed to develop a coherent and nation-wide movement. It has always had local rather than national character.
Localism defines one of the most striking characteristics of Kurdish nationalism. This typical characteristic of Kurdish nationalism provided a background of which determined the century-long failure of Kurdish nationalism.
The international power struggle for the Middle East, initiated with the first Gulf War, which culminated in the toppling of Saddam's regime in Iraq, presented new opportunities as well as new challenges for fragmented Kurdish national politics.
Establishment of a unified Kurdistan Regional Government, unification of Kurdistan Parliament, selection and appointment of a Kurdistan president, and the unification of Peshmerga forces in the south are some of the healthy signs that indicate the maturity of Kurdish national politics in this part of Kurdistan. These positive signs, however, should not blind an informed and critical approach to the chronicle illness imbued in and fragmented nature of Kurdish nationalism.
In spite of the relative achievement of the southern Kurds, Kurdish nationalism in general still suffers fragmentation, localism, and lack of a coherent national political program. These persistent weaknesses of Kurdish nationalism and its failure to transcend the structural limits of the political and cultural fragmentation of Kurdish identity is the sole threat to the future of both the political establishment in the south and national identity and culture of the Kurds.
Kurdish historiography and the bulk of Kurdish nationalist discourse share a misconceived belief that attribute political and social developments in Kurdistan either to structural limitations or international power positions vis-à-vis to the Kurds. They fail to pay attention to the role of agency in making history. They have not so far considered the role of agency as the activities, ideas, and objectives of people or group of individuals or states or international institutions to act intentionally to shape their social, economic, and political conditions. Agency implies the ability of persons to choose courses of action and, acting upon their choices, to bring about certain social and political changes because of their capacity to do so. Emphasizing the role of agency is not just for theoretical argument but more crucially for practical consequences. This suggests that the future of the Kurds depends not just on the existing structure of Kurdistan and the Great Powers' policies toward or against Kurdistan, but the activities, intentions, and policies that the Kurds may develop.
This, then, brings a crucial and determinant role for the Kurdish political actors to overcome the existing deficiencies in Kurdish national politics. The available political picture of Kurdistan indicates a grim aspect of Kurdish nationalism apart from a tiny but encouraging hope that glom in southern Kurdistan.
For Kurdish nationalism to overcome its obstacles, there are two crucial steps that are imperative: establishment and development of civil society coupled with democratization of political institutions. This is indispensable for the general interests of the Kurdish nation. Distinguished scholar Abbas Vali rightly argued that "now, more than ever before in its history, Kurdish nationalism needs to be grounded in an active and growing civil society, not just because it has to overcome the centrifugal tendencies of a deeply fragmented politics but also, and more importantly, because it has to create a nationalist political culture to enable it to withstand the crushing force of four violently aggressive official nationalisms."
Southern Kurdistan, due to its internal and international political position, can foster and work towards a civil and democratic society. The initial step for realizing this is the rethinking of the role of the Kurdish political establishment in economy.
Currently, the relationship between economy and the government and political groups in Kurdistan resembles those of state-led economies. The Kurdish government and more importantly the dominant Kurdish political parties must not appropriate the surplus labor in Kurdistan. Liberal and free-market economy should not be only in discourse but also in practice. Wherever the state has direct interest in surplus appropriation, there is no chance for development of civil society and democratization of political establishments. The history of the world provides ample evidence.
Secondly, Kurdish national movements must overcome their century-long fruitless localism. Due to its regional and international character, the future of each part of Kurdistan affects the other parts and thus chances of a local movement in any part of Kurdistan would be relative and conjectural and its survival or collapse intimately connected to the developments or its relation to the other parts. This suggests that Kurdish national movement must be nationwide and its guiding principles must take priority of Kurdistan as a whole. Localism is the cul-de-sac of Kurdish nationalism and it only brings disaster as the 20th-century history of Kurdistan witnessed in abundant.
The international power struggle for the Middle East, initiated with the first Gulf War, which culminated in the toppling of Saddam's regime in Iraq, presented new opportunities as well as new challenges for fragmented Kurdish national politics.
Establishment of a unified Kurdistan Regional Government, unification of Kurdistan Parliament, selection and appointment of a Kurdistan president, and the unification of Peshmerga forces in the south are some of the healthy signs that indicate the maturity of Kurdish national politics in this part of Kurdistan. These positive signs, however, should not blind an informed and critical approach to the chronicle illness imbued in and fragmented nature of Kurdish nationalism.
In spite of the relative achievement of the southern Kurds, Kurdish nationalism in general still suffers fragmentation, localism, and lack of a coherent national political program. These persistent weaknesses of Kurdish nationalism and its failure to transcend the structural limits of the political and cultural fragmentation of Kurdish identity is the sole threat to the future of both the political establishment in the south and national identity and culture of the Kurds.
Kurdish historiography and the bulk of Kurdish nationalist discourse share a misconceived belief that attribute political and social developments in Kurdistan either to structural limitations or international power positions vis-à-vis to the Kurds. They fail to pay attention to the role of agency in making history. They have not so far considered the role of agency as the activities, ideas, and objectives of people or group of individuals or states or international institutions to act intentionally to shape their social, economic, and political conditions. Agency implies the ability of persons to choose courses of action and, acting upon their choices, to bring about certain social and political changes because of their capacity to do so. Emphasizing the role of agency is not just for theoretical argument but more crucially for practical consequences. This suggests that the future of the Kurds depends not just on the existing structure of Kurdistan and the Great Powers' policies toward or against Kurdistan, but the activities, intentions, and policies that the Kurds may develop.
This, then, brings a crucial and determinant role for the Kurdish political actors to overcome the existing deficiencies in Kurdish national politics. The available political picture of Kurdistan indicates a grim aspect of Kurdish nationalism apart from a tiny but encouraging hope that glom in southern Kurdistan.
For Kurdish nationalism to overcome its obstacles, there are two crucial steps that are imperative: establishment and development of civil society coupled with democratization of political institutions. This is indispensable for the general interests of the Kurdish nation. Distinguished scholar Abbas Vali rightly argued that "now, more than ever before in its history, Kurdish nationalism needs to be grounded in an active and growing civil society, not just because it has to overcome the centrifugal tendencies of a deeply fragmented politics but also, and more importantly, because it has to create a nationalist political culture to enable it to withstand the crushing force of four violently aggressive official nationalisms."
Southern Kurdistan, due to its internal and international political position, can foster and work towards a civil and democratic society. The initial step for realizing this is the rethinking of the role of the Kurdish political establishment in economy.
Currently, the relationship between economy and the government and political groups in Kurdistan resembles those of state-led economies. The Kurdish government and more importantly the dominant Kurdish political parties must not appropriate the surplus labor in Kurdistan. Liberal and free-market economy should not be only in discourse but also in practice. Wherever the state has direct interest in surplus appropriation, there is no chance for development of civil society and democratization of political establishments. The history of the world provides ample evidence.
Secondly, Kurdish national movements must overcome their century-long fruitless localism. Due to its regional and international character, the future of each part of Kurdistan affects the other parts and thus chances of a local movement in any part of Kurdistan would be relative and conjectural and its survival or collapse intimately connected to the developments or its relation to the other parts. This suggests that Kurdish national movement must be nationwide and its guiding principles must take priority of Kurdistan as a whole. Localism is the cul-de-sac of Kurdish nationalism and it only brings disaster as the 20th-century history of Kurdistan witnessed in abundant.
0 comments:
Post a Comment