Wall Street Journal
By Yochi J.Dreazen and Philip Shishkin in Iraq , and Greg Jaffe in Washington
September 4, 2007
Central Government Loses Clout to Regions; Bush Skips Baghdad The Bush administration is quietly moving toward a major shift in Iraq policy, driven by successes in formerly intractable insurgent strongholds combined with dispiriting failures at fostering national reconciliation. After almost four years of trying to build Iraq 's central government in Baghdad , the U.S. has found that what appears to work best in the divided country is just the opposite. So senior military officials are increasingly working to strengthen local players who are bringing some measure of stability to their communities. The new approach bears some striking similarities to the "soft partition" strategy pushed by senior Democrats, and suggests that despite the often bitter debate in Washington on Iraq policy, a broad consensus on how to move ahead in the war-torn country may be forming. President Bush yesterday made a surprise trip to Iraq in advance of an upcoming congressional debate on the war. In a symbolic nod to the emerging administration strategy, it was his first trip to the country that didn't involve a stop in the capital of Baghdad . Instead he visited the former Sunni-insurgent stronghold of Anbar province, where he met with local sheiks who have received tens of millions of dollars in cash as well as training to help fight al Qaeda insurgents in Iraq . The sheiks "told me that the kind of bottom-up progress that your efforts are bringing to Anbar is vital to the success and stability of a free Iraq ," Mr. Bush told a crowd of about 750 soldiers and Marines. Mr. Bush yesterday suggested that if the local gains the U.S. is making continue to hold it could begin to reduce U.S. troop levels by the end of the year. Senior Bush administration officials, including the president, still talk about the importance of national reconciliation between the three main sectarian and ethnic groups often at war with each other: the minority Sunnis who ruled under Saddam Hussein, the long-oppressed Shiite majority, and northern Iraq 's Kurds. Indeed most of the 18 benchmarks drawn up by Congress earlier this year focus on key national reconciliation goals, such as a compact to share oil revenues and loosening draconian laws that had been aimed at purging from power any Sunnis with even a distant affiliation with Mr. Hussein's Baath Party. According to several high-level U.S. reports, the Iraqi government in Baghdad is failing in almost all of those endeavors. When Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker deliver their much-anticipated report to Congress next week they are likely to acknowledge little progress toward achieving these goals which had been central to President Bush's Iraq strategy. But they are also certain to point to big gains at the local level, in places like Anbar province, where violence has plummeted. At Gen. Petraeus's urging, Mr. Bush is also expected to announce a new infusion of aid to the Sunni Arab regions. The aid, which comes on top of $125 million pumped into the province so far this year, would be given directly to local leaders, instead of passing through the central government in Baghdad. Gen. Petraeus also is expected to assert next week that sectarian killings have fallen by more than half in Baghdad due to the increased presence of troops on the street. Increasingly commanders in Iraq say that their pessimism and frustration with the current Iraqi government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, have led them to focus more intensely on efforts to build up local security forces and funnel reconstruction projects through local sheiks. "The problems in Iraq are going to be stopped from the ground up, not from the top down," says Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, who commands U.S. forces in the mixed Sunni-Shiite area south of Baghdad . "At the national level you still get sectarian decisions being made, so you work on building capacity from the ground up." The new approach was born last winter in Sunni-dominated Anbar province, where senior Marine officials courted local sheiks with millions of dollars in cash for reconstruction projects and help training their men to fight radical Sunni terrorists. Since then it has spread through large swaths of Iraq as commanders elsewhere have followed the Marines' lead. In Baghdad , the U.S. military is training and paying Sunni "neighborhood watch" groups to guard their homes. In the latest move in the strategy, American commanders are trying to export recent success co-opting Sunni sheiks to the much more strategically important Shiite tribes. American commanders for the first time are pushing these leaders to turn against extremists from their own sect, much like U.S. officers have convinced Sunni chiefs to turn against Sunni extremists in places like Anbar. Among the Shiite tribes south of Baghdad , the Americans' weapon of choice has become the "concerned citizens" agreement. A typical deal involves the U.S. forking over a monthly payment of $350 per tribal guard willing to fight. The money is channeled through local sheiks who in return promise to keep their areas safe from attacks against Americans. Conversely, senior military officials are worrying less about the dysfunctional central government that has been the focus of so much effort in the U.S. military and political strategy over the last three years. The change is the simple outgrowth of what the summer surge of more than 30,000 troops into Iraq has wrought. The U.S. has been most successful in areas where it has taken an intensely local approach, working with local leaders who share U.S. goals. The logical result of the new policy is a profound shift away from the Bush administration's original goal of building a multisectarian democracy in the heart of the Middle East . Instead, the new strategy seems likely to lead to an Iraq with a very weak central government and largely self-governing and homogenous regions. Over the long term the goal is to connect these local leaders to the central government by making them dependent on Baghdad for funds. To qualify for U.S. assistance, local groups must pledge loyalty to the central government, though many Sunni leaders who are working with the U.S. complain the Shiite dominated government is illegitimate. Some military officials say the local focus seems to be leading to an outcome that looks similar to the "soft partition" or federalism approach advocated by a growing number of Democrats, including Joseph Biden of Delaware , chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a longshot candidate for president. Senior Bush administration officials, of course, have never used the phrase "soft partition." Instead President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates often refer to the new approach as "bottom-up reconciliation." Yesterday the president expressed hope that the military successes would "pave the way for political reconciliation." Gen. Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq , often refers to the need for "accommodation." He argues it is unrealistic to think Iraqis will reconcile any time soon. But maybe they can "accommodate" each other. Whether it's called "accommodation," "bottom-up reconciliation" or "soft partition," U.S. officials quietly acknowledge that they are basically talking about a strategy focused on strengthening local leaders to make them more self-sufficient and less reliant on the central government. "If the central government doesn't want to take control, maybe the locals will," said one senior U.S. commander who has played a key role in crafting the new approach. "It is too early to tell. We are riding a tiger. It may take us where we want to go." To be sure, this approach has problems of its own. In some cases, Mr. Maliki's weak government has fought the U.S. efforts to build local Sunni-dominated security forces. The government in Baghdad , which is dominated by Shiites, worries that these troops could some day turn on it. In other cases, the government in Baghdad seems to fear a loss of power and resources. "If the government of Iraq does not buy into these local accommodations and deals, the progress will be transitory," said one senior Army officer who advises Gen. Petraeus. Mr. Maliki has repeatedly denied that either he or his weak ruling coalition has a sectarian agenda. He also recently voiced support for a draft of a new law that would ease the ban on former members of Mr. Hussein's Baathist party, who were largely Sunni. That law must still be approved by parliament. The potential -- and the limits -- of the current U.S. approach are evident in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul , which was once one of Iraq 's most violent cities. Today, Mosul is in the midst of a remarkable turnaround. There hasn't been a car bomb or large-scale attack there since early May, and U.S. commanders say the number of attacks in Mosul has dropped by half. No Americans have been killed there this year. U.S. commanders give most of the credit to local Iraqi security commanders like Col. Qader Saleem Qader, an intelligence officer who tracked and killed two key insurgent leaders in recent weeks, and to his boss, Gen. Jassim Habib Moutaa. Mr. Maliki's government hasn't rewarded Gen. Moutaa and Col. Qader for their successes, however. Instead, U.S. officers say the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad has refused to promote either of the men, pay their salaries on time, or give the division its proper allotment of uniforms, weapons and other equipment. "My Iraqi counterparts used to tell me that the entire government in Baghdad was controlled by Iran , and I didn't believe them," said Col. Christopher Mitchell, who commands a U.S. military advisory team that works with the division. "Now I'm not so sure," he added, referring to widespread suspicions that the Shiite government in Tehran is undermining any signs of success by the rival Sunnis or Kurds. The Iraqi government vehemently denies its policies are being influenced by Iran . Another barrier could be the Iraqis themselves. Shiite leaders, who represent the majority of Iraqis, aren't eager to cede power to Sunnis. It isn't clear either that Sunnis will be willing to settle for a vast swath of land with few oil resources leaving them dependent on the Shiites for future revenue. "I don't think any of Iraq 's communities would be happy with a soft partition type of solution," said one adviser to Gen. Petraeus. The new approach also has shown uneven results in Shiite areas and may even be fueling some Shiite-on-Shiite violence in the south as various tribal and militia groups try to consolidate political and economic control over provinces and towns. Shiite Arabs make up some 60% of Iraq 's population. U.S. officials say extremist Shiite militias constitute one of the biggest challenges to stability across the country. "Any kind of Shia effort to come back to the center would be decisive," says U.S. Army Maj. Craig Whiteside, stationed south of Baghdad in Iskandariyah. For now, getting Shiite tribal elders to resist extreme militias is proving more difficult in many cases than winning over Sunni sheiks, who saw many of the extremist Sunni elements as outsiders to their tribal ways. The Shiite militias, by contrast, are often viewed by the locals as a necessary, if violent, defense against Sunni extremists. For example, in a cluster of Shiite villages called Jiff Jaffa, an American effort to co-opt local villagers away from Shiite militias, shows how difficult it can be to break the hold of Shiite militias. A year ago, the Americans helped the villagers set up an agricultural union, donating fertilizer and several tractors. Then, about a month ago, the Americans decided to broaden their alliance with Jiff Jaffa and offered the villagers a "concerned citizens' deal." Several U.S. soldiers had been killed on roads skirting the area by "explosively formed penetrators," a particularly deadly type of a roadside bomb favored by extreme Shiite militias. The U.S. troops wanted those routes secured. The Jiff Jaffa leaders embraced the idea and promised to come up with a list of 150 tribal guards. The list took a long time to draft. The Americans assumed Jiff Jaffa's elders simply couldn't agree which tribesmen should get the job, a typical holdup. But a more disturbing picture soon emerged. Village elders had arranged a meeting with Shiite militants in a local mosque and asked for permission to cooperate with the Americans. "We negotiated with [Shiite militants] for 10 days," recalls a local farmer who would only introduce himself as Abu Ahmed out of fear of retribution. "They said you are not allowed to work for the coalition forces." Like many moderate Shiites, the farmer is chafing under the militants' intimidation and attempts to impose strict Islamism on the villagers. He complained about militant bans on alcohol and told stories of a relative smuggling booze in the tires of his car. "In three months, I'm going to Syria to drink some beers and relax," he said. Shiite militants took root in Jiff Jaffa in part because Sunni extremists in a neighboring area waged war on the Shiite tribes. Over time, the Shiite militias' defensive moves against the Sunni incursions have helped entrench them in many Shiite communities. "Sunnis have a problem with al Qaeda, but Shiites don't have the same problem with their militias, at least not yet," says Sabah al-Khafaji, a local sheik of a large Shiite tribe. Despite these reservations, village elders finally signed the deal with the Americans over the weekend. It's too early to tell how effective the deal will be. It's also too early to tell how the mosaic of local deals will play out at the national level. Mr. Bush was met in Anbar province, the former heartland of the Sunni insurgency, by Mr. Maliki, the Shiite prime minister who rarely visits the province. In recent weeks Bush administration officials along with Democratic lawmakers have criticized Mr. Maliki for moving too slowly to reconcile with Sunnis. Mr. Maliki's presence was clearly intended to show that national reconciliation is still a long-term goal. But some U.S. officials worry that the local deals may actually be impeding the Bush administration's policy aims. The deals are made with groups that are almost entirely Sunni or Shiite. "This works against national level accommodation because it politicizes sectarian identity," said one military strategist in the region.
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